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REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEES DISCHARGED
FOR REPORTING AN EMPLOYER'S
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW
Under common law tradition, employers had the prerogative to discharge
non-contract employees at will.' The "employment at will" rule provided
that employers could freely discharge employees without cause or notice
because no contract term specified the length of employment. 2 Likewise,
an employee was free to leave the job voluntarily at any time.
3
Recently, however, judicial decisions4  and legislative enact-
1. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1915) (employer has constitutional right
to terminate employees at will); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (employer
has absolute right to discharge employee); Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d
439, 441 (7th Cir.) (employment agreement is terminable at will if agreement does not specify
length or duration of employment), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Odell v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 128 (10th Cir.) (employment relationship not governed by contract
is terminable at will), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953).
2. See Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1974) (absent statute
or agreement, employer may discharge employee without cause); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270
F.2d 71, 78 (8th Cir. 1959) (contract of employment for indefinite term is terminable by either
party without cause or notice). See generally S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. 1967); A, CORaN, 3A CORBI ON CONTRACTS § 684, at
224 (1960). Absent exceptions for public policy or other reasons, the employment at will rule
remains valid in every American jurisdiction. See, e.g., Comerford v. International Harvester
Co., 235 Ala. 376,-., 178 So. 894, 896 (1938); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So.2d 89,
90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 173, 319 A.2d
174, 176 (1974); see also B. ScIEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 744-46
n.25 (2d ed. 1983) (list of state courts applying employment at will rule). The employment at
will rule was established in the late nineteenth century because of policies encouraging freedom
of contract and employers' freedom to manage business. See Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R.
Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884) (employers are free to discharge employees at will just as
employers are free to buy and sell in market at will). See generally P. SELZNICK, LAW, SocmTY
AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 130-37 (1969) (nineteenth century concepts of freedom of contract,
freedom of enterprise, and laissez-faire account for development of employment at will rule).
3. See B. Scm.I & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW 743 (2d ed. 1983)
(absent explicit language in employment contract either party can terminate employment
relationship).
4. Courts have challenged the employment at will rule based on theories of contract and
implied covenant of good faith. See B. ScmHL~ & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 747-48 (2d ed. 1983) (listing state courts using contract theories to abrogate employment
at will rule). Some state courts have implied a contract term governing grounds for an employee's
discharge although no express contract existed. Id. For example, state courts have found that
internal company memoranda, verbal representations made by the employer, employee hand-
books, and an employee's detrimental reliance on an offer of employment may create an implied
contract between the employee and employer concerning the grounds for the employee's
discharge. See, e.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., 55 Cal. App.3d 91, 97, 127 Cal. Rptr.
222, 225 (1976) (finding that employer must have just cause to dismiss employee who was
induced to leave former employment); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29,-, 469 P.2d 177,
181 (1970) (employee's move to Hawaii to accept job constituted implied contract of employment
because employee detrimentally relied on job offer); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
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ments 5 have limited severely an employer's absolute right to discharge non-
union employees at will. For example, one recent change in the law has
408 Mich. 579, 617, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980) (court found implied requirement of just cause
for discharge in employer's representations and in employee's Blue Cross Manual); Yartzoff v.
Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651,-, 576 P.2d 356, 360 (1978) (court infers just
cause requirement for termination from language in employee handbook indicating that em-
ployees were entitled to probationary period). But see Neth v. General Elec. Co., 65 Wash.2d
652, -, 399 P.2d 314, 318 (1965) (employer's oral representations during union campaign
were opinions, not promises). Additionally, some state courts have presumed that an implied
covenant of good faith exists between an employee and employer so that any discharge in bad
faith constitutes a breach of the employment contract. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
111 Cal. App.3d 443, 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980) (company's policy to hold hearing
to determine whether to discharge employee is one element in finding implied covenant of good
faith); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, -, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257-58
(1977) (termination of employment in order to avoid paying commission to employee constitutes
breach of implied covenant of good faith); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 131,
316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (bad faith or malicious termination of employee constitutes breach of
implied employment contract).
Commentators have urged courts and legislatures to place limitations on an employer's
broad power to terminate at will. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. R~v. 1404, 1410 (1967)
(criticism of employer abuse of right to discharge at will); Jenkins, Federal Legislative Exceptions
to the At-Will Doctrine: Proposed Statutory Protection for Discharges Violative of Public
Policy, ALB. L. REv. 466, 512-24 (1983) (description of proposed employee discharge protection
statute); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA.
L. Rav. 481, 484 (1976) (arguing for abrogation of harsh employment at will rule); Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HAuv. L. REv. 1816, 1836-37 (1980) (advocating limitation on employer's right
to terminate at will based on contractual duty to act in good faith); Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 335, 362 (1974) (arguing for protection of employees'
jobs through application of contract principles); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At
Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of
Public Policy, 1977 Wisc. L. Rav. 777, 799-812 [hereinafter cited as Protecting the Private
Sector Employee] (analyzing whistleblower exception to employment at will rule).
5. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(9), 2302(b)(8) (1982) (federal employees are protected against
reprisal for disclosure of violation of any law, rule, or regulation); Consumer Credit Protection
Act § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982) (employer may not discharge employee because court
garnishes employee's wages); Jury System Improvement Act § 6(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982)
(employer may not discharge employee because of employee's jury service); National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982) (prevents employers from discharging
employees to discourage union organization); Fair Labor Standards Act § 15(a)(3), 20 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3) (1982) (retaliatory discharge against employees who exercise right to report violations
of Act is illegal); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 11(c), 20 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(1982) (prohibits employer discharge of employee for filing complaint disclosing health or safety
violations of Act, instituting proceedings, or testifying in exercise of employee's rights under
Act); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982)
(unlawful for employer to discharge employee based on individual's age if employee is between
ages of forty and seventy); 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1982) (guarantees re-employment for military
veterans); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)
(prohibits employee discharge on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
California's labor statutes are representative of the statutes many states have passed to
limit employer's power to terminate employees at will. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12940(a)
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provided a limitation on the employment at will rule called the "whistleblower
exception. ' 6 The whistleblower exception provides employees with a cause
of action in wrongful discharge against an employer when the employee has
been discharged for reporting the employer's violations of law. 7 Although
state courts have recognized a cause of action for whistleblower employees
who report violations of state law to appropriate state authorities, employees
who report violations of federal law have not enjoyed the same protection
against discharge in either federal or state forums." Underlying the question
of whether employees fired for reporting violations of federal law should
have a cause of action are two related issues. First, courts have questioned
whether states have an interest in upholding federal public policy.9 Second,
(West 1980) (prohibits discharge based on race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, physical handicaps,
medical condition, and marital status); CAL. LAB. CODE § 6310 (West Supp. 1985) (prohibits
employer from terminating employee for filing claim under California Occupational Safety and
Health Act); CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West Supp. 1985) (prohibits discharge of employee for
serving on jury); see also infra notes 39-44 and text accompanying notes 37-45 (state whistle-
blower statutes prevent discharge of employee for reporting employer's violations of law).
6. See C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: FORMA-
TION, OPERATION AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH § 9.1.3 at 120 (1984 Supp.) (courts attempt to
protect whistleblower employees when discharge of whistleblower employee contravenes public
policy).
7. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,-., 427 A.2d 385, 389
(1980) (employee who was discharged for insisting that employer comply with Connecticut
Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was fired in contravention of mandate of public policy);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 135, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981)
(employee stated cause of action for retaliatory discharge when employee was discharged for
supplying information to local law enforcement authorities that company officials may have
violated Illinois criminal code); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116,-., 246 S.E.2d
270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (employee stated cause of action for wrongful discharge when fired
for preventing employer from violating West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act).
But see Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1977) (court
rejected public policy exception in case of employee discharged for refusing to falsify medical
records); Andress v. Augusta Nursing Facilities, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 775, -, 275 S.E.2d 368,
369 (1980) (nursing home employee discharged for refusing to falsify employer's report has no
cause of action against employer for wrongful discharge); Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688,
-, 386 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (1979) (employee discharged for reporting that his supervisor
received kickback payments stated no cause of action because no statute prohibited such
discharge).
8. See Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir.
1984) (termination of employee in retaliation for employee's safety complaints stated no cause
of action in wrongful discharge because employee acted in behalf of no state law or policy);
Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 118 L.R.R.M. 2031, 2035 (7th Cir. 1984) (unclear under Indiana law
whether state's exception to employment at will rule applies when source of right or duty upon
which employee relies derives from federal law); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 117
L.R.R.M. 3195, 3196 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (termination of employee who reported employer's
violations of federal aviation law stated no cause of action for retaliatory discharge); Campbell
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (1980) (discharge of employee who reported employer's
violations of federal food and drug laws stated no cause of action under exception to state
employment at will rule).
9. See Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 116 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3157 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (no state
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courts have examined whether a particular federal statute provides an implied
private right of action for discharged employees.' 0
Commentators and courts have urged abrogation of the employment at
will rule based on both contract" and tort 2 theories. The whistleblower
exception to the employment at will rule is part of a larger public policy
exception.' 3 State courts specifically have challenged the common law em-
ployment at will rule for public policy reasons based on tort theories.
4
Several courts have recognized an erosion of the employment at will doctrine
interest exists in implementing federal public policy); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 117
L.R.R.M. 3195, 3196 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (state has no interest in enforcing federal aviation law).
10. See Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1981) (no implied cause
of action exists under federal aviation laws in favor of pilot discharged for reporting employer's
safety violations); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 117 L.R.R.M. 3195, 3196 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (Federal Aviation Act does not prohibit discharge for reporting safety violations).
11. See supra note 4 (listing courts which have challenged employment at will rule based
on theories of contract and implied covenant of good faith).
12. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Ca.3d 167, 176-77, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335-
36 (1980) (employee's discharge for refusal to participate in price-fixing scheme creates action
in wrongful discharge); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, -, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975) (recognizing
cause of action for employees who were fired for serving jury duty).
13. See C. BAKALY & J. GRossMAN, supra note 6, § 9.1-9.1.3 at 116-22 (cause of action
for discharge for whistleblowing is part of public policy exception to employment at will rule).
Commentators have divided the public policy exception into three categories. Id.; see Protecting
the Private Sector Employee, supra note 4, at 78-99. In the first category, courts have provided
a cause of action to employees discharged in retaliation for refusing to commit an illegal act.
See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 190, 344 P.2d 25, 27
(1959) (termination of employee who refused to commit perjury violates public policy); Trom-
betta v. Detroit, T. & I.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489,- , 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978)
(termination of employee for employee's refusal to alter records creates cause of action for
wrongful discharge). In the second category, courts have provided a cause of action to employees
discharged in retaliation for exercising a vested statutory right. 265 N.W.2d at 390; see Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 185, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-58 (1978) (at will employee fired for
filing workmen's compensation claim states cause of action for wrongful discharge against
employer); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, -, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428
(1973) (Indiana provides exception to employment at will rule in case of worker fired for filing
workmen's compensation claim). But see Thurston v. Macke Co., 716 F.2d 255, 255 (4th Cir.
1983) (employee discharged for asserting workmen's compensation claim states no cause of
action under Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act); Sloane v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
505 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (no cause of action exists for retaliat6ry discharge of
employee who receives reduced employment benefits as result of filing workmen's compensation
claim). In the third public policy exception, courts provide a cause of action to employees
discharged for reporting an employer's violation of law. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 179 Conn. 471,-, 427 A.2d 385, 389 (1980) (termination of employee who insisted that
employer comply with Connecticut Uniform Food Drug and Cosmetic Act contravened mandate
of public policy); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 135, 421 N.E.2d 876,
880 (1981) (termination of employee who supplied information to local authorities that company
officials may have violated Illinois criminal code violates public policy and creates action in
wrongful discharge).
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (courts using tort theories to limit employ-
ment at will rule). See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,-, 427 A.2d
385, 389 (1980) (discharge of employee for insisting that employer comply with Connecticut
Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was fired in contravention of mandate of public policy);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (discharge of employee for
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if termination of an employee undermines an important public policy. 5 For
example, courts have recognized a cause of action based on wrongful
discharge for employees who report an employer's violation of a state law.' 6
The justification for protecting whistleblowing employees is the belief that
whistleblowers advance the public interest by reporting violations of public
health, safety, or environmental standards.' 7 Courts also have acknowledged
that whistleblowers who report violations of antitrust law serve an important
public function since whistleblowers significantly enhance government en-
forcement of antitrust law.'8 Courts have viewed employees as possessing a
unique position in which to discover and report employer wrongdoing.' 9
Commentators and courts, however, have suggested that despite their im-
portant social function, whistleblowers are often placed in a difficult posi-
tion.2' On one hand, the employee faces possible criminal or civil penalties
reporting employer's violation of West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act states
cause of action for wrongful discharge). But see Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688,-., 386
N.E.2d 1026, 1027-28 (1979) (termination of employee for reporting that employee's supervisor
received kickback payments stated no cause of action for wrongful discharge).
15. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,-, 427 A.2d 385,
389 (1980) (employee who was discharged for insisting that employer comply with Connecticut
Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was fired in contravention of mandate of public policy);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 135, 421 N.E.2d 876, 879-80 (1981)
(discharge of employee for supplying information to local authorities that company officials
may have violated Illinois' criminal code violates public policy and creates action in wrongful
discharge); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 161 W. Va. 116, -, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va.
1978) (termination of employee for reporting employer's violation of West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act states cause of action for wrongful discharge).
16. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,-, 427 A.2d 385, 389
(1980) (discharge of employee for insisting that employer comply with Connecticut Uniform
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was fired in contravention of mandate of public policy); Harless
v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (discharge of employee for reporting
employer's violation of West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act states cause of
action for wrongful discharge). But see Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, -, 386 N.E.2d
1026, 1027-28 (1979) (termination of employee for reporting that employee's supervisor received
kickback payments stated no cause of action for wrongful discharge).
17. See Protecting the Private Sector Employee, supra note 4, at 778-79 (responsible
whistleblower employee works in public's best interest because whistleblower acts as form of
social control over organization).
18. See Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776, 780 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(employee discharged for refusal to participate in antitrust conspiracy had standing under section
4 of Clayton Act to recover damages from employer for wrongful discharge); Perry v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1388-89 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (discharge of employee for
refusing to continue in anti-competitive conspiracy creates claim for wrongful discharge under
public policy exception to employment at will rule).
19. See Solomon & Garcia, Protecting the Corporate Whistle Blower Under Federal Anti-
Retaliation Statutes, 5 J. Coiu. L. 275, 275-76 (1980) (employees play pivotal role in helping
government locate and correct violations of environmental, health, and safety statutes).
20. Id. at 279.
21. See Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1981) (employee who
reported employer's safety violations to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) faced with
conflict between loss of job on one hand and potential loss of lives on other hand); Protecting
19851 1387
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if the employee participates in the employer's illegal activity.22 On the other
hand, the employee risks the possibility of discharge for reporting the
employer's illegal activity.23
In general, the public policy exception to the employment at will rule
seeks to provide redress to discharged employees when the discharge would
undermine an important public policy. 24 In the leading case of Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,25 the District Court of Appeals for
the Second District of California determined that an employee fired for
refusing to violate state law had a cause of action for wrongful discharge.
26
In Petermann, the plaintiff employee was fired after refusing to commit
perjury before a committee of the California Legislature. 7 The Petermann
court first noted that an employer's right to discharge an employee may be
limited by considerations of public policy. 28 The Petermann court reasoned
that since perjury tends to interfere with the proper administration of justice,
the law must deny the employer's right to freely discharge employees who
refuse to commit perjury on the employer's behalf.
29
Courts have expanded the public policy exception to the employment at
the Private Sector Employee, supra note 4, at 779 (whistleblower employee must balance
obligation to report illegal activity against likelihood of job termination).
22. See Protecting the Private Sector Employee, supra note 4, at 779 (employees risk
criminal liability for participation in employer's illegal activity). The Federal Aviation Act
(FAA) provides civil and criminal penalties for employees engaging in illegal activity. See 49
U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) (prescribing civil penalties not to exceed $1,000 for each violation of
Federal Aviation Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1472(a) (1982) (prescribing criminal penalties for any person
who knowingly or willfully violates any provision of Federal Aviation Act for which no penalty
is otherwise provided) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1981) (employer
discharged plaintiff for reporting violations of Federal Aviation Act); Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 ll.2d 124,-, 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1981) (employer discharged plaintiff
allegedly for supplying information to local law enforcement officials concerning another
employee's alleged criminal activity); Trombetta v. Detroit, T. &. I. R. Co., 81 Mich. App.
489, 496, 265 N.W.2d 385, 386 (1978) (plaintiff alleged that employer had discharged plaintiff
for plaintiff's refusal to alter pollution control reports).
24. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1374 (9th Cir. 1984) (state's
interest in providing cause of action for violation of public policy is enforcement of underlying
policy, not regulation of employment relationship); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1936 (1983) (basis
for public policy exception of employment at will rule is to enforce underlying public policy).
25. 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
26. Id. at...., 344 P.2d at 27.
27. Id. at 26. The defendant in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters employed
the plaintiff as a business agent. Id. The plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify before the Assembly
Interim Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy of the California Legislature. Id.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant instructed the plaintiff to make false statements at the
committee hearing. Id. The plaintiff gave truthful answers at the committee hearing and was
subsequently fired. Id.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. The Petermann court stated that the public policy against perjury derives from
the California Penal Code, which makes the commission of perjury unlawful. Id. The Petermann
court notes that the threat of criminal prosecution for committing perjury is not in itself
1388 [Vol. 42:1383
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will rule to include the discharge of employees who report an employer's
violation of law.3 0 In Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont,3a the West
Virginia Supreme Court relied primary on state consumer credit protection
statutes to find a cause of action for an employee discharged for reporting
violations of the state laws to his superiors and to bank auditors.3 2 The
plaintiff in Harless, an at will employee, noticed that the defendant bank
had intentionally overcharged customers on repayment of their installment
loans in violation of the state and federal consumer credit and protection
laws.3 The bank fired the plaintiff after he reported the violations to a
member of the Bank's Board of Directors and later assisted bank auditors
in investigating the violations. 34 The West Virginia Supreme Court in Harless
held that the state legislature intended to establish a clear and unequivocal
public policy that protected consumers of credit under the state act. 5 The
Harless court stated that denying a whistleblower employee a cause of action
for wrongful discharge would frustrate such public policy because the
employee had acted to protect the rights of consumers.
36
In addition to state court decisions providing rights of action for
employees discharged for reporting violations of state law, state legislatures
have enacted statutes expressly forbidding discharge of whistleblower em-
ployees.3 7 In general, three types of whistleblower statutes exist.3 8 The first
sufficient to discourage perjury. Id. Therefore, the Petermann court reasoned, to more fully
effectuate the state's public policy against perjury, that the civil law must deny the employer
the right to discharge an employee who refused to commit perjury. Id. To hold otherwise, the
Petermann court reasoned, would be to encourage criminal conduct on the part of the employee
and employer. Id.
30. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471,-, 427 A.2d 385, 389
(1980) (termination of employee for insisting that employer comply with Connecticut Uniform
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act contravened public policy); Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 135, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (employee stated cause of action for
retaliatory discharge when employer had discharged employee for supplying information to
local law enforcement authorities that company officials may have violated Illinois criminal
code).
31. 246 S.E.2d 270 fV. Va. 1978).
32. Id. at 275-76; see W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-101 (1977 Rep. Vol.) (West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act).
33. 246 S.E.2d at 272. The plaintiff in Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont first
reported violations of state and federal consumer credit protection laws to his superior at the
defendant bank. Id. One year later, Harless reported the illegal activities to a member of the
defendant's Board of Directors. Id. Shortly thereafter, Harless assisted auditors of the bank by
supplying them with records and files of consumer loans. Id. at 273. The bank subsequently
fired Harless. Id.
34. Id. at 273.
35. Id. at 275-76.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 39-44 and text accompanying notes 38-45 (categorizing state whistle-
blower statutes). Michigan was the first state to enact a general whistleblower protection statute.
See MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981) (whistleblower statute became effective on
March 31, 1981).
38. See infra notes 39-44 and text accompanying notes 39-45 (categorizing whistleblower
statutes).
1985] 1389
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
type prohibits discharge of a public employee who reports violations of any
state or federal law, rule, or regulation to any person. 39 The second type of
state whistleblower statute prohibits discharge of any employee who reports
a violation of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation to a public body.
40
The statutes in the second category generally define public body as any
political subdivision of the state. 41 Third, a state whistleblower statute may
protect any employee who reports a violation of a state or federal law, rule
or regulation to any authority.42 Nearly every whistleblower statute provides
some minimal protection to employees who report violations of federal law.
43
The extent of coverage of state whistleblower statutes varies from state to
state within the three broad categories, 44 but the statutes indicate a general
state interest in enhancing federal public policy.
45
Courts applying state law have been slower than legislatures to provide
a remedy to discharged employees who report violations of federal law,
46
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1983 Rep. Vol.) (prohibits discharge of state
employee who reports violation or suspected violation of federal or state law or regulation);
KANs. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(b) (1984) (provides that no supervisor or appointing authority of
any state agency shall prohibit state civil service employee from reporting any violation of state
or federal law, rules, or regulations to any person); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 12G (1983
Rep. Vol.) (state appointing authority may not discharge state employee as reprisal for disclosure
of information evidencing violation of any law, rule, or regulation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74,
§ 841.7 (1984 Supp.) (state employee who provides information to any member of legislature,
legislative committee, administrative hearing, or court of law is protected against disciplinary
actions); OR. REv. STAT. § 240.316(5) (1983) (no state employee is subject to disciplinary action
for disclosure of violation of laws, rules, other improper actions, or inefficiency of superior
officers or fellow employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-15-3 (1984) (state shall not discharge state
employee because employee reports to public body violation of state or federal law); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 42.40.010 (1984 Supp.) (state government shall not discourage state employees
from disclosing improper governmental actions); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.81, 230.83 (West
Supp. 1984) (state employee with knowledge of information concerning violation of any law
may disclose that information to any person without fear of discharge).
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6ldd(b) (1985 Supp.) (employees protected from
discharge for reporting violations of law to state attorney general); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, §§ 831-840 (Supp. 1984) (employer shall not discharge employee for reporting violations of
law to public body); MICH. Coup. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (1981) (same).
41. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 832(4) (Supp. 1984) (public body means state
officer or any subdivision of state or local government); MICH. Comr'. LAWS ANN. § 15.361
(1981) (same).
42. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1984 Supp.) (employer shall not retaliate against
employee if employee discloses any employer activity which has violated any law).
43. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (whistleblower statutes protect employees
who report violations of federal as well as state law).
44. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1 (West 1985 Supp.) (protects only those employees
who report violations of environmental laws or regulations).
45. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (whistleblower statutes provide cause of
action for employees discharged for reporting violations of federal law).
46. See Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir.
1984) (discharged employee who reported employer's violation of Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act cannot seek protection of state law because state has little interest in enforcing
federal law); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 116 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3158 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (discharged
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though some state and federal courts have recognized a cause of action for
employees discharged for reporting violations of federal law.47 The majority
of courts applying state law consistently have refused to provide a cause of
action for an employee discharged for reporting violations of federal law
because states have little interest in enforcing federal law through state public
policy.48 For example, in Rachford v. Evergreen International Airlines,49 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
the state of Illinois has no interest in enforcing federal aviation law.50 In
Rachford, the plaintiff employee was a flight engineer employed by Ever-
green.5  The plaintiff noticed excessive oil consumption of a particular aircraft
in violation of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aircraft maintenance
requirements and reported the violation to the FAA.12 Evergreen subsequently
fired the plaintiff, and the plaintiff sued Evergreen alleging wrongful dis-
charge in violation of Illinois common law and the Federal Aviation Act.53
The Rachford court held that a successful plaintiff in a suit for retaliatory
discharge must allege that the termination of employment occurred in
employee who reported employer's violations of federal aviation laws states no cause of action
in wrongful discharge under state law); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061
(1980) (employee discharged for reporting employer practices that violated federal drug regula-
tory laws states no cause of action in wrongful discharge).
47. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 578-79 (D. Md. 1982)
(employee terminated for uncovering acts of bribery which violated federal statutes has cause
of action in wrongful discharge); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, ,
685 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash. 1984) (state has interest in enhancing federal public policy as
expressed in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by providing employee discharged for reporting
violations of Act with cause of action).
48. See Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 117 L.R.R.M. 3195, 3196 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(termination of employee for reporting violations of feder-.l aviation law does not contravene
state public policy); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 116 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3157 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (state
has little interest in enforcing federal aviation rules and regulations).
49. 117 L.R.R.M. 3195 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
50. Id. at 3196.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The employee in Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines sought to invoke the Illinois
common law exception to the employment at will rule. Id.; cf. Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 135, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (at will employee who reported
violations of Illinois criminal law stated cause of action for wrongful discharge against
employer); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 185, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-58 (1978) (at will
employee fired for filing workmen's compensation claim stated cause of action for wrongful
discharge against employer).
The employee in Rachford also alleged wrongful discharge in violation of the Federal
Aviation Act (FAA). 117 L.R.R.M. at 3196. See 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982) (describing powers
and duties of Federal Aviation Administration to set minimum standards of safety); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1425 (1982) (describing duty of air carrier to maintain and repair equipment used in air
transportation).
The employee in Rachford further alleged wrongful discharge in violation of the Railway
Labor Act. 117 L.R.R.M. at 3196. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (duty of common carriers and
employees to settle disputes to prevent disruption of commerce). Id. § 181 (1982) (making § 152
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contravention of a clear mandate of state public policy.5 4 The Rachford court
found that the plaintiff's claim arose as a violation of federal public policy
instead of state public policy.5 5 Thus, the Rachford court held that the
plaintiff had no claim for wrongful discharge because the state has no interest
in enforcing federal law even though Illinois incorporates federal aviation
law into the state's general public policy favoring aviation safety.
6
Although the Rachford court determined that the state had no interest
in enforcing federal law, other courts applying state law have concluded that
a clear expression of federal public policy provides discharged employees
with a viable cause of action for wrongful discharge under state common
law. 57 Several states have incorporated clear expressions of federal public
policy 8 into general state public policy through legislative enactments and
judicial decisions. For example, in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 9 a
federal district court incorporated federal public policy into the state common
law. 60 In Adler, the plaintiff employee claimed the employer had discharged
him in an effort to cover up the plaintiff's knowledge that the defendant's
subsidiaries had been paying bribes to the defendant's customers. 6' The
of FAA applicable to air carriers). The plaintiff in Rachford argued that his consultation with
fellow employees and representation of the employees' safety concerns to management consti-
tuted protected activity within the Railway Labor Act. 117 L.R.R.M. at 3196. The Rachford
court held that because the plaintiff did not belong to a union and the Railway Labor Act does
not cover activities unrelated to union organizing, the plaintiff's claim must fail. Id.
54. 117 L.R.R.M. at 3196.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. 1984) (employee stated
cause of action for wrongful discharge when employer discharged employee for refusing to
violate federal law), aff'd, 687 S.W.2d 733 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
Wash.2d 219, -, 685 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash. 1984) (employee terminated for uncovering
acts of bribery which violated federal statutes has cause of action for wrongful discharge). But
see Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (1980) (employee who was discharged
for reporting employer's violations of regulations promulgated by United States Food & Drug
Administration states no cause of action for wrongful discharge).
The Washington Supreme Court has held that Washington has an interest in enforcing
federal public policy as enunciated in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash.
1984). In Thompson, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer fired him because the
plaintiff instituted accurate accounting procedures in compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Id. The Thompson court first held that Washington had not adopted the implied
covenant of good faith exception to the employment at will rule. Id. at 1086. The Thompson
court further held that the state of Washington had adopted the public policy exception to the
employment at will rule and that the state has an interest in enhancing the principles underlying
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Id. at 1089-90.
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting state courts which rely on federal
public policy to provide a cause of action in wrongful discharge to employees); notes 39-41 and
text accompanying notes 37-41 (state whistleblower statutes protect employees who report
violations of federal law).
59. 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982).




complaint alleged that the employer's violation of federal tax and antitrust
statutes also constituted a violation of the public policy of Maryland. 62 The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland first noted that the
state civil law remedy for abusive discharge does not seek to enforce federal
law, but rather to promote the policy underlying federal law. 63 The Adler
court further noted that a state's promotion of federal public policy does
not offend principles of federal sovereignty and extraterritoriality because
state courts regularly and competently decide questions of federal law.64 The
Adler court also considered whether a state's engrafting of federal public
policy into state civil law offends the concept of state sovereignty. 65 The
Adler court concluded that the state of Maryland, as a matter of public
policy, would choose to discourage bribery.66 Therefore, the Adler court
concluded that an employee's discharge for refusal to participate in bribery
would undermine the state's public policy.67 Thus, the Adler court determined
that the plaintiff had a cause of action under state law for wrongful
discharge.
61
In a similar case involving alleged federal antitrust violations, a state
supreme court granted the plaintiff employee a cause of action in wrongful
discharge because the state had an interest in promoting federal public policy
by protecting employees who refuse to commit antitrust violations. 69 In
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc.,70 the plaintiff alleged that the employer
discharged her in order to prevent the plaintiff's testimony at any subsequent
criminal trials concerning the employer's antitrust violations. 7' The plaintiff
in Parnar had observed and participated in the employer's scheme to regulate
62. Id. at 577. The plaintiff in Adler v. American Standard Corp. alleged that the
defendant had violated Maryland antitrust laws and several federal statutes, including the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at 577-78.
63. Id. at 578. The Adler court rejected the contention that federal enforcement of federal
law preempts state enforcement of federal law because the state was not seeking to enforce
federal law, but rather to promote the principles underlying the federal law. Id.
64. Id.; see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (state
courts have presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction over federal claims absent provision by
Congress to the contrary); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980) (state court may hear
and decide federal claim if Congress has not granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts).




69. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 870, - , 652 P.2d 625 (1982).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 627. The defendant in Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc. employed the plaintiff
as a secretary to the controller of the hotel. Id. at 626. The plaintiff in Parnar collected
information from various hotels concerning their rates and occupancy percentages. Id. The
Justice Department subsequently investigated the defendant's practice of exchanging rates and
occupancy percentages with other hotels, and obtained criminal indictments against the defend-
ant for engaging in anti-competitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. The defendant
then discharged the plaintiff. Id. at 627.
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occupancy and rate schedules among similar hotels.72 The Supreme Court of
Hawaii stated that prior judicial decisions and constitutional, statutory, or
regulatory provisions may establish state public policy for purposes of
wrongful discharge.7 3 The Parnar court derived public policy in this case
from federal antitrust laws, reasoning that Congress intended federal antitrust
laws to encourage individuals to challenge antitrust violations. 74 The Parnar
court concluded that retaliatory discharge in furtherance of violations of
federal antitrust laws contravenes state public policy because the state has
an interest in protecting whistleblower employees. 75 The decision in Parnar
implicitly supports the proposition that states have an interest in enforcing
the policies underlying federal antitrust law.
76
In addition to supporting the public interests underlying federal antitrust
laws, states also may have an interest in enhancing the policies underlying
other federal statutes. For example, in Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc.,7 7 the
Texas Court of Appeals for the Ninth District held that an employee
discharged for refusing to violate federal law had a viable cause of action
against an employer under state law.78 In Hauck, the employee alleged that
the employer had discharged him for refusing to pump the bilges of a vessel
at a place where federal law prohibited pumping. 79 Although the Hauck
court never cited the particular federal law prohibiting pumping at certain
sites, the court held that an employee discharged for refusing to commit an
unlawful act stated a valid exception to the Texas employment at will rule.80
By implication, the Hauck court concluded that Texas has an interest in
promoting federal laws that enhance public safety.8 '
Despite the conclusion suggested by the cases allowing a state cause of
action for employees who report violations of federal statutes, not all states
will protect employees who disclose information under federal law.8 2 States
should protect employees who report violations of federal law, however,
because contrary to the reasoning of some state courts, states do have an
interest in promoting federal public policy and enforcement of federal law. 3
72. Id. at 626.
73. Id. at 631.
74. Id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10
(1977) (Congress enacted Clayton Act to extend remedy under section 4 of Sherman Act to any
person injured by virtue of any antitrust violation)).
75. 652 P.2d at 631 (citing McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. I111 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(Clayton Act construed to provide remedy for employee discharged for refusing to participate
in price-fixing scheme)).
76. 652 P.2d at 631.
77. 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
78. Id. at 324.
79. Id. at 323.
80. Id. at 324.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 46 and 48-49 and accompanying text (citing state courts' reluctance
to provide remedy to employees discharged for reporting violations of federal law).
83. See Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551,
1394 [Vol. 42:1383
DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES
Under our system of federalism, states may regulate employment relations
through their police powers.8 However, the purpose behind the public policy
exception to the employment at will rule is to enforce the underlying statute
or law, and not to regulate the employment relationship." States thus have
a general interest in protecting whistleblower employees from discharge for
reporting violations of law. A state's interest in protecting employees should
extend to employees who are discharged for reporting violations of federal
law for the same reason that states protect employees who report violations
of state law. State courts have an interest in protecting employees who report
violations of state laws because that protection generally promotes the
enforcement of laws.
86
Aside from the interest that states have in enforcing certain federal laws
to ensure the health and safety of the state's citizens, the United States
Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.87 has held that
states must enforce federal law. 88 The Mondou court stated that when
Congress adopts an act or a statute, the policy underlying the statute must
be respected in the courts of a state as if the policy had emanated from the
state's legislature. 9 The Court thus held that states must recognize rights
arising under federal law.90 One problem with state enforcement of the policy
underlying many federal statutes is the congressional grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction of the statutes. 9' A congressional grant of exclusive
jurisdiction does not, however, preclude indirect enforcement of the policy
1554 (1960) (Supreme Court can require states to enforce federal statutes if statutes are non-
penal and if state has enforced an analogous state-created right).
84. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X (police powers reserved to states).
85. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1374 (9th Cir. 1984) (state's
interest in providing cause of action for violation of public policy in discharging employee is to
enforce underlying policy not to regulate employment relationship). In Garibaldi v. Lucky Food
Stores, the plaintiff alleged that the employer discharged him because the plaintiff reported a
shipment of spoiled milk to local health officials after the employer had ordered him to deliver
it. Id. at 1374. Since the plaintiff was a union member, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's
rights under the collective bargaining agreement preempted the plaintiff's wrongful discharge
claim. Id. at 1369. The Garibaldi court concluded that the state's interest in protecting the
public transcends the employment relationship, and thus the collective bargaining agreement
does not preempt the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 1375.
87. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
88. Id. at 57. The United States Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., held that states must enforce the Federal Employer's Liability Act in state courts. Id.
89. Id.; see McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) (state may
not discriminate against federal claims).
90. 223 U.S. at 57; see C. WiGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45 at
193 (4th ed. 1983) (absent congressional grant of federal jurisdiction, state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts).
91. See 49 U.S.C. § 1487(a) (1982) (United States district courts have jurisdiction over
matters arising from violations of the FAA); cf. Ward v. State, 280 Md. 485,-_, 374 A.2d
118, 1122 (1977) (federal aviation law preempts state aviation law except for state-imposed
criminal penalties for violations of state aviation law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
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underlying the federal statute. For example, despite the congressional grant
of exclusive federal jurisdiction over antitrust laws, courts applying state law
have acted to protect individuals who report violations of federal antitrust
law by using state wrongful discharge law.92 One way in which states may
enhance federal policy is to provide rights of action under state common law
to employees who report violations of the federal law.
Currently, state courts are divided over whether whistleblower employees
discharged for reporting violations of federal law have a remedy under state
common law.93 Discharged employees may have a federal remedy for re-
porting violations of a federal statute if that statute specifically provides a
right of action for employees who are discharged for exercising rights under
the statute. 94 Federal courts cannot protect whistleblowing employees unless
Congress has expressed an affirmative intent to create a right of action for
employees. 95 The Federal Aviation Act (FAA), for example, provides no
express private right of action for employees discharged for reporting viola-
tions of the FAA or for refusing to commit violations of the FAA.96 Several
courts also have determined that Congress never intended to imply a private
right of action under the FAA for employees discharged for reporting
violations of the FAA. 97 To determine whether implied rights of action exist
under the FAA for discharged employees, courts have used the four factors
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. 9 In Cort v.
92. See Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982)
(discharge of employee who refused to continue in alleged anti-competitive conspiracy creates
claim for wrongful discharge under state public policy exception to employment at will rule);
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 850, -, 652 P.2d 625, 626 (1982) (employee
discharged to prevent employee's testimony regarding employer's antitrust activities states cause
of action in wrongful discharge).
93. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (citing state courts which fail to recognize
cause of action for employees discharged for reporting employer violations of law).
94. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 550(c) (1982)
(provides right of action for employee discharged for reporting violations of Act); infra note
128 (federal statutes providing express rights of action for discharged employees).
95. See Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 116 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3156 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (no implied
right of action in FAA for employees discharged for reporting violations of FAA).
96. See Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1981) (no express right
of action exists under the FAA for discharged employees); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines,
117 L.R.R.M. 3195, 3196 (N.D. I1. 1984) (Congress did not expressly provide right of action
under FAA for discharged employees).
97. See Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1981) (no implied private
right of action exists under the FAA for discharged employees); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 116
L.R.R.M. 3155, 3157 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (Congress did not intend to create implied right of action
for retaliatory discharge in FAA); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 117 L.R.R.M. 3195,
3196 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (no implied right of action exists under FAA for retaliatory discharge).
98. 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 115 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3156-57 (S.D.
Ind. 1984) (court applied Cort v. Ash analysis in determining that no implied right of action
existed under FAA for employees discharged for reporting violations of FAA); Rachford v.
Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 117 L.R.R.M. 3159, 3196 (N.D. Il. 1984) (no implied cause of action
exists for discharged employees because no congressional intent existed to create cause of
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Ash, the United States Supreme Court set out a four-part test for determining
whether a court may imply a private remedy from a statute that does not
expressly provide a remedy. 99 First, the Ash Court determined that the
plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
created.'0° Second, an indication of congressional intent to create a remedy
must exist.' 0' Third, the implied remedy must be consistent with the purpose
of the legislative scheme.'0 2 Fourth, the cause of action must not be tradi-
tionally relegated to state law.' 0 3
Court decisions in which a plaintiff has attempted to invoke an implied
right of action under the FAA focus on whether Congress intended to create
a right of action.'04 For example, in Buethe v. Britt Airlines,05 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that Congress
had not intended that the FAA protect airline employees.' ° In Buethe, the
plaintiff alleged that the employer discharged the plaintiff for refusing to fly
an aircraft that the plaintiff claimed was unsafe. 0 7 The plaintiff reported
the safety problems to the FAA after his discharge. 08 The Buethe court
relied on the Supreme Court's four-step analysis in Cort v. Ash in determin-
ing that the pilot had no implied cause of action under the FAA.1' 9 The
action). See generally Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action and the
Federal Aviation Act: A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VILL. L. RFv. 657, 659-73
(1977-78) (describing FAA implied rights of action cases applying Cort v. Ash criteria).
99. 422 U.S. at 78.
100. Id. (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (court will imply
private right of action under federal statute if Congress enacted statute for especial benefit of
party)).
101. Id. (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (court must have indication of legislative intent in order to imply private
right of action)).
102. Id. (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (private implied right of action must be consistent with underlying purposes
of legislative scheme)).
103. Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (federal court should imply
rights of action only in areas not relegated by Congress to state law)).
104. See Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding no
implied right of action under FAA in favor of aircraft owners because no congressional intent
to create right of action existed); Snuggs v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,631,
17,632 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (Congress did not intend private action as means of enforcement of
FAA provisions).
105. 116 L.R.R.M. 3155 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
106. Id. at 3156 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974) (outlining four-step analysis for
implying private rights of action)).
107. 116 L.R.R.M. at 3156. The plaintiff in Buethe v. Britt Airlines, a copilot, refused to
fly regularly scheduled passenger flights on two separate occasions. Id. at 3155. On one
occasion, the plaintiff refused to fly because the "autofeather system" was inoperative. Id. The
Buethe plaintiff again refused to fly after observing alleged discrepancies in the maintenance
log and malfunctions of the engine fire detection system. Id. The employer in Buethe discharged
the plaintiff two months after the second refusal to fly. Id. at 3156.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Buethe court applied the first part of the Cort v. Ash test and noted that
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Buethe court found that Congress intended to protect the safety of airline
passengers, but had not intended to protect whistleblower employees from
wrongful discharge. 10 The Buethe court concluded that since Congress left
the regulation and enforcement of the FAA to the expertise of the Federal
Aviation Administration, the plaintiff had no right of action in a federal
court. 11
At least one court has bypassed the traditional Cort v. Ash analysis and
used a basic tort analysis in determining whether the discharged employee's
injury resulted from the employer's violation of a federal statute." 2 In
Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp.," 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected a former pilot's claim that the FAA provided an
implied right of action for wrongful discharge. 1 4 The plaintiff in Pavolini
reported the defendant's violation of the FAA's air safety regulations to the
FAA and subsequently was discharged. "5 The plaintiff argued that an implied
right of action existed under the FAA allowing a pilot discharged for
reporting violations of FAA safety provisions to bring suit against the
offending employer." 6 The Pavolini court bypassed a Cort v. Ash analysis
in favor of a tort analysis and inquired whether the FAA created a duty in
the air carrier, and whether the violation of that duty caused an injury." 7
The Pavolini court stated that because the FAA does not create a duty in an
airline to continue to employ an employee, the FAA does not prohibit a
carrier from discharging an employee for reporting safety violations to the
copilots are not members of the class for whose especial benefit the FAA was created. Id.
Under the second part of the Cort v. Ash analysis, the Buethe court found that Congress in
enacting the FAA did not intend to protect employees from wrongful discharge. Id. The Buethe
court also found in applying the third part of the Cort v. Ash analysis that the underlying
purpose of the legislative scheme embodied in the FAA does not warrant finding an implied
right of action for employees because Congress already had created an administrative agency to
insure compliance with the FAA. Id.
110. Id. at 3157; see Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1976)
(finding no implied right of action under FAA in favor of aircraft owners because no
congressional intent to create right of action existed). In Rauch, the plaintiffs were aircraft
owners suing to recover the cost of a defective altimeter manufactured by the defendant. Id. at
454. The plaintiffs in Rauch asserted liability under the theory that a cause of action arose
under the FAA because the defendant's alleged violation of the FAA injured the plaintiffs. Id.
The Rauch court concluded that the FAA granted no right of action to persons injured by
violations of the FAA. Id.
111. 116 L.R.R.M. at 3157. Although the court in Buethe held that the plaintiff had no
implied cause of action under the FAA, the court expressed its reluctance to make a decision
which might imply that airline employees should hesitate to point out violations of the FAA.
Id.
112. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text (describing four part Cort v. Ash
test).
113. 645 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 147.
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id. at 146-47.
117. Id. (citing Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 1976)
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FAA." 8 The court concluded that the plaintiff's injury did not arise from
the employer's violations of the FAA." 9 Thus, the plaintiff's discharge in
Pavolini created no injury that a federal court can redress.' 20
Some courts have expressed an unwillingness to imply private rights of
action under the FAA in favor of employees discharged for reporting
violations of federal law.'2 ' The reluctance to grant relief to injured plaintiffs
hampers public concern over such matters as aircraft safety, public health,
and the environment.' 22 Many employees, such as airline pilots, are in an
advantageous position to observe safety violations.' 2 Responsible whistle-
blowers deserve some protection from the courts to alleviate the burden on
the limited resources of the Federal Aviation Administration and other
federal investigatory agencies in investigating potential safety abuses.2 4 Given
(Congress did not intend FAA to protect employees who are discharged for reporting violations
of the FAA)).
118. 645 F.2d at 147. The Pavolini court first inquired whether the plaintiff's injury
resulted from the employer's disregard of the statute. Id. The court in Pavolini concluded that
the plaintiff's injury did not flow from the defendant's failure to obey any statutory requirement
or from a violation of any statutory prohibition. Id.
119. Id. Although the Pavolini court refused to provide a right of action for the discharged
employee, the court stated that the defendant in fact had violated the FAA as discovered in a
later inspection. Id.
120. Id. The Pavolini court concluded that a remedy for wrongful discharge lies in the
state courts, which have traditionally regulated the employment relationship. Id. at 148.
121. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing courts which have refused to create
implied rights of action in favor of employees discharged for disclosing information under
FAA).
122. See Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 116 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3157 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (public policy
favoring airline safety is enhanced if employees are not hesitant to point out violations of FAA
to employer or to FAA). In many cases, courts have been willing to protect employees who
report violations of federal antitrust laws. See Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp.
776, 780-81 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (employee discharged for refusing to participate in antitrust
conspiracy states cause of action because discharge flowed directly from employer's unlawful
conduct). But see In Re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1982)
(complaint alleging retaliatory discharge for plaintiff's refusal to participate in anticompetitive
practices was not cognizable because antitrust practices did not injure employee). Wrongful
discharge suits under federal antitrust laws differ significantly, however, from wrongful discharge
suits under other federal laws because antitrust statutes provide an express right of action for
persons injured by the antitrust activity. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (provides
right of action for any person injured in his business or property by reason of any action
prohibited by antitrust laws). Traditionally, antitrust plaintiffs must meet three requirements to
recover under section 4 of the Clayton Act. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
473-84 (1982). First, the plaintiff must show that his injury is related to the anticompetitive
effects of the antitrust conduct. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
489 (1977). Second, the plaintiff's injury must be direct. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 745 (1977). Third, the plaintiff must show that recovery is not speculative or duplicative
and thus would undermine enforcement of the antitrust laws. Id.
123. See Solomon & Garcia, supra note 19, at 276 (whistleblower is in advantageous
position to gain access to information regarding violations of federal safety statutes).
124. See id. at 297 (current staff of Occcupational Safety and Health Administration is
overburdened and enforcement of safety provisions suffers). But see Crawford & Schneider,
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the lack of remedies available in state or federal courts for federal whistle-
blowers, recourse to Congress is necessary. 25 Congress must either amend
those federal statutes which do not protect whistleblower employees, or enact
a general whistleblower statute.
26
Congress may choose to amend federal statutes such as the FAA by
inserting specific provisions prohibiting the retaliatory discharge of whistle-
blower employees. 27 Congress has inserted such provisions in other federal
legislative schemes dealing with public health, safety, and the environment. 28
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)
contains a section prohibiting discharge of any employee who has brought a
proceeding under or related to OSHA. 29 The purpose of OSHA is to protect
workers from unsafe working conditions. 30 One serious problem with pro-
tecting an employee's rights under OSHA, however, is that only the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can bring suit on behalf
of a discharged employee.' 3 ' If OSHA refuses to proceed on behalf of the
discharged employee, the employee cannot sue his employer on his own
behalf. 3 2 Additionally, a discharged employee must have attempted to correct
Cort v. Ash, 23 Vnm.. L. REv. 657, 671 (1977-78) (private remedy under FAA would interfere
with legislative intent to centralize in single agency the authority to enforce air safety rules).
125. See Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1981) (Congress must
affirmatively act to protect federal whistleblowers against retaliatory discharge); Buethe v. Britt
Airlines, 115 L.R.R.M. 3155, 3157 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (congressional amendment of FAA is
necessary in order to create right of action under FAA for discharged employees).
126. See Jenkins, Federal Legislative Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine: Proposed Statu-
tory Protection for Discharges Violative of Public Policy, 47 ALB. L. Rav. 466, 513-24 (1983)
(setting out proposed employee discharge protection act).
127. See infra note 128 (examples of wrongful discharge provisions in federal statutes).
128. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (1982) (no employer may
discharge employee because employee has testified to, commenced proceeding under, or assisted
investigation of any violation of Act); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 703, 30
U.S.C. § 1293 (1982) (no person shall discharge employee by reason of fact that employee has
provided information under Act); Clean Water Act § 507, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982) (discrimi-
nation against persons filing, instituting, or testifying in proceedings under Act is prohibited);
Safe Drinking Water Act § 1450, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1982) (no employer may discharge
employee for providing information, testifying, or commencing proceedings under Act); Solid
Waste Disposal Act § 7001, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1982) (protects employees who have commenced
proceeding or testified concerning any violations of this Act); Clean Air Act § 322, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7622 (1982) (no employer may discharge employee because employee has commenced pro-
ceeding, testified, or assisted in investigation under Act).
129. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
130. See Taylor Diving & Salvage Com. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 599 F.2d 622, 626 (5th
Cir. 1979) (purpose of OSHA is to protect health and safety of workers and to improve physical
working conditions on employment premises); 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) (purpose of OSHA is
to encourage employers and employees to reduce number of safety and health hazards at places
of employment).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) & (3) (1982).
132. Id. § 660(c)(2) (1982); see McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 1979)
(party in OSHA proceeding precluded from obtaining judicial review of final order of Com-
mission if party failed to pursue administrative remedies).
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the employer's OSHA violations before the whistleblower employer may
recover under OSHA for wrongful discharge.'33
Other federal environmental and safety statutes afford additional pro-
tection in varying degrees to workers discharged for reporting violations of
the statutes. 3 4 For example, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (Mine
Safety Act) protects employees who give testimony, file a charge, institute
an enforcement proceeding, or report alleged safety and health violations
under the Mine Safety Act. 3 5 Congress enacted the Mine Safety Act to
impose strict mine regulations to prevent accidents. 36 The purpose of the
anti-retaliation provisions in the Mine Safety Act is to encourage the disclo-
sure of information concerning violations of the Act. 137 Like OSHA, the
Mine Safety Act prohibits the discharge of a worker for exercising any right
under the Mine Safety Act. 3 However, the discharged employee first must
file a complaint with the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration
alleging discrimination under the Mine Safety Act. 1
39
Given the limitations involved in the retaliatory discharge provisions of
the Mine Safety Act and OSHA, and the impracticability of amending the
numerous federal statutes that do not contain retaliatory discharge provi-
sions, a more reasonable alternative is for Congress to enact a general
whistleblower statute. Commentators have pointed out that specific proscrip-
tions against employee discharge in other federal statutes are limited in the
amount of protection afforded to whistleblower employees. 4 One commen-
tator has suggested that Congress may avoid piecemeal statutory protection
133. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980) (in order for employee to
obtain protection of OSHA antidiscrimination section, employee must have attempted to obtain
correction of dangerous condition by employer).
134. See Jenkins, supra note 4, at 482 (some federal statutory proscriptions against
discharge protect employees who participate only in proceedings resulting from administration
and enforcement of relevant act's provisions).
135. Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act § 105(c), 30 U.S.C. § 820(b) (1982); see
Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(notifying employer of alleged Mine Safety Act violation is protected employee activity).
136. See National Independent Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 391 (1976)
(purpose of Mine Safety Act is to prevent death and injury in mines resulting from accidents
and disaster); 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (1982) (purpose of Mine Safety Act is to promulgate health
and safety standards to protect safety of miners).
137. See Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (purpose of discriminatory discharge provision in Mine Safety Act is to encourage
reportings of suspected violations of safety regulations by deterring retaliation from mine
operators); S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3401, 3435 (Congress intended employees to have right under Mine Safety Act to
refuse work in unsafe or unhealthful conditions).
138. 30 U.S.C. § 820(b) (1982).
139. Id. § 820(b)(2) (1982).
140. See Jenkins, supra note 4, at 483 (all statutes protecting employees from discharge
contain limited time periods in which to file complaint that severely limit employees' remedies
for wrongful discharge); Solomon & Garcia, supra note 19, at 282-85 (employee protection
1985]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
of federal whistleblower employees by enacting a comprehensive whistle-
blower statute.1 4' The advantages of such a statute include the avoidance of
inconsistencies between states which protect federal whistleblower employees
and states which do not protect whistleblower employees.' 42 Moreover, a
general whistleblower statute would avoid inconsistencies among those federal
statutes with retaliatory discharge provisions and those without such provi-
sions. 43 An additional advantage of a federal whistleblower statute would
be that the whistleblower statute would protect all employees, thereby equally
and uniformly enforcing employers' compliance with federal statutes.
As the law presently stands, employees who report violations of federal
law remain unprotected against discharge. 44 State courts may refuse to
provide federal whistleblower employees with a cause of action under state
common law because states have no interest in promoting federal public
policy.' 45 However, states have a duty to enforce federal law and thus have
an interest in enhancing federal public policy.' 46 Federal courts have refused
to provide a right of action for discharged employees if no implied private
right of action exists under a specific federal statute. 47 Congress should
enact a comprehensive federal whistleblower statute in order to promote
employer compliance with federal statutes and to enhance federal public
policy. A federal whistleblower statute will enable the federal government
not only to protect employees who disclose information, but also to gain
valuable information regarding violations of federal law.
R. TAYLOR ABBOT, JR.
provision in OSHA limited because only OSHA can bring action, filing period is short,
complaints are backlogged, and penalties are too weak).
141. See Jenkins, supra note 4, at 513-24.
142. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussion of inconsistent state treatment
of whistleblowing employees).
143. See supra notes 128-139 (discussion of federal statutes which protect employees who
are discharged for reporting employer's violations of the statutes).
144. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussion of courts' reluctance to protect
employees fired for reporting violations of federal law).
145. See supra note 46 & 48 and accompanying text (courts applying state law have little
interest in enforcing federal public policy by providing federal whistleblowing employees with a
cause of action).
146. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussion of states' interest in enhancing
federal public policy).
147. See supra note 97 (courts are unwilling to imply rights of action under FAA).
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